October 25, 2018
(while it lasted)
increased access to voting, election of black politicians, reduced racial violence (Chacon and Jensen)
increased literacy, earnings, voting (Stewart and Kitchens; Rogowski)
increased local tax collection, literacy, and earnings (Logan; Suryanarayan and White)
Expand the electorate to include new, supportive voters
Republicans are explicit about this (Vallely 2004)
Party leaders on suffrage expansion:
"political suicide"
Radical agenda key issue of 1866 and 1868 elections
During 1868 election campaign in Iowa
Attorney General Edward Bates:
"That the great principle of the Republicans [was] negro equality [is] a down-right falsehood"
Abolitionist critics:
Republican party was a party for "white men, not for all men"
(Blattman 2009, Parker 2009)
(Jha and Wilkinson 2012)
(Koenig 2016; Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015)
~24 percent of 1870 electorate
new, intense experience with large consequences (e.g. Costa and Kahn)
(Skocpol 1993)
Interaction \(\xrightarrow{}\) reduced prejudice; "earned" citizenship
Exposure to slavery \(\xrightarrow{}\) moral, strategic need for abolition (Manning 2007).
Combat and loss experience \(\xrightarrow{}\) commitment to cause (Union and Liberty); antipathy toward enemy (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015, Koenig:2016)
Undoubtedly true by the 1880s; unlikely in 1860s
Absent individual-level data…
relational database of soldiers, units, combat
geographic location of regiments over time
\[\begin{aligned} GOPVoteshare_{ie} & = \alpha_{i} + \alpha_{e} + \\ & \beta Enlistment_i * CivilWar_e + \epsilon_i + \epsilon_t \end{aligned}\]
To inspect parallel trends \[\begin{aligned} GOPVoteshare_{ie} & = \alpha_{i} + \alpha_{e} + \\ & \sum_{y = 1854}^{1920} \beta_y Enlistment_i * Year_y + \epsilon_i + \epsilon_t \end{aligned}\]
\[\Delta Suffrage_{i} = \alpha_{state} + \beta Enlistment_i + \epsilon_i\]
\[PostSuffrage_{i} = \alpha_{state} + \gamma PreSuffrage_{i} + \beta Enlistment_i + \epsilon_i\]
Dependent variable: | ||||
(Vote %) | (Elig. %) | (Vote %) | (Elig. %) | |
Pro-Suffrage | Δ Pro-Suffrage | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Enlistment (%) | 0.320*** | 0.173*** | 0.433*** | 0.258*** |
(0.098) | (0.064) | (0.118) | (0.081) | |
Constant | 0.394*** | 0.424*** | 0.306*** | 0.354*** |
(0.035) | (0.022) | (0.037) | (0.026) | |
Lagged DV | Yes | Yes | No | No |
Differenced | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 |
Note: | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |||
Data from state constitutional referenda across 131 counties in IA and WI. All models include state fixed effects. Robust Standard Errors |
Wartime experiences likely as-if-random, conditional on enlistment timing, but…
Estimates local partial effect of \(W_i\) for case \(i\) in neighborhood \(j \neq i\) weighted by similarity to \(X_i\), where weights \(\alpha_j\) reflect frequency of \(i\) and \(j\) appearing in same leaf in regression trees.
\[\hat{\theta}(x_i) = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j(x_i) (W_j - (\sum \alpha_j(x_i)W_j)) (Y_j - (\sum \alpha_j(x_i) Y_j))}{\sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j(x_i) (W_j - (\sum \alpha_j(x_i)W_j))^2}\]
We can obtain the conditional average partial effect: \[APE = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i = 1}^n \frac{Cov(W_i, Y_i | X = X_i)}{Var(W_i | X = X_i)}\]