December 4, 2025
Science:
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2022) investigate:
Has automation of work helped or hurt workers?
Data:
“Cases”:
Rather than looking at wages in industries with more automation, or change in wages in the US over time, use a difference in differences:
They compare:
Change in real wages for demographic groups with high exposure to automation between 1980 and 2016 (change in \(Y\) for group where \(X\) changes)
Change in real wages for demographic groups with low/no exposure to automation between 1980 and 2016 (change in \(Y\) for group where \(X\) does not change)
Assume that counterfactual trend in wages for workers exposed to automation SAME as factual trend in wages for workers not exposed to automation.
For groups with greater increase in automation exposure, greater decline in wages
Correlation suggestions Automation \(\xrightarrow{causes}\) declining wages
For this to be the causal effect of automation, need to believe that wages for workers exposed / not exposed to automation would have been similar without automation…
No differences in wage trends before automation.
It still could be that other things that affect wages changed differently for workers exposed to automation than for those who were not.
“capital takes what it will in the absence of constraints and technology is a tool that can be used for good or for ill… Yes, [during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century] you got progress, but you also had costs that were huge and very long-lasting. A hundred years of much harsher conditions for working people, lower real wages, much worse health and living conditions, less autonomy, greater hierarchy. And the reason that we came out of it wasn’t some law of economics, but rather a grass roots social struggle in which unions, more progressive politics and, ultimately, better institutions played a key role — and a redirection of technological change away from pure automation also contributed importantly.”
Luddites?
Yes… Luddites.
Yes… Luddites.
Mueller and Schwarz (2023) investigate:
Did Trump’s tweeting of anti-Muslim messages increase anti-Muslim hate crimes?
Trump’s Twitter gained attention as he ran for President.
Made nearly 300 negative tweets about Muslims.
When Trump gained prominence, anti-Muslim hate crimes increased
Compare
Counties with more SXSW Twitter Joiners (treated) see larger increase in hate crimes following rise of Trump’s Twitter
Days with Trump golfing followed by more hate crimes

Counties with more Twitter user have more hate crimes on days after Trump tweets while golfing
With reasonable assumptions (no different trends in places with more SXSW 2007 attendees on days when Trump golfs), social media rhetoric causes hate crimes.
What explains right-wing radicalization in the United States? Existing research emphasizes demographic changes, economic insecurity, and elite polarization. This paper highlights an additional factor: the impact of foreign wars on society at home. McAlexander et al (2024) argue communities that bear the greatest costs of foreign wars are prone to higher rates of right-wing radicalization. U.S. military engagements predict surges in membership of far-right organizations as veterans “bring the war home,” and experts note military and law enforcement personnel are disproportionately represented in far-right political organizations.
To examine this claim, they examine the correlation between fatalities during the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and activity on Parler in US counties. Comparing counties with similar population density, % military aged, Republican voting, internet access, education, income, refugee population, racial composition, and military service, they find greater war casualties increases Parler video uploads
The green transition should result in far-reaching changes in the labor market. There are new opportunities for “green” jobs related to environmental sustainability, but also entire communities face uncertain futures due to their reliance on the extraction or burning of fossil fuels. Far-right parties have often campaigned against climate change policies. Do right-wing messages against climate change cause workers and communities that rely on jobs with greater emissions to shift their vote toward the right?
To examine this question, Heddesheimer et al (2025) examine the case of the AfD (a far-right political party) in Germany. In 2016, the AfD shifted from supporting to opposing a green energy transition. The researchers compare the change in votes for the AfD between 2010-2015 and 2016-2019 among workers in high-carbon emitting industries vs. the change in votes for the AfD among workers in low-carbon emitting industries.
They find that support for the AfD increased more among workers in high-emitting industries than among workers in low-emitting industries.
Social media algorithms profoundly impact our lives: allegedly increasing anger and fear and amplifying political polarization. Yet our understanding of these algorithms’ impact has been limited, as platforms are often unwilling to test (and publish) analyses of these claims.
Piccardi et al (2025) built a browser extension that intercepted and re-ranked web-based social media feeds. Using an LLM identified content expressing antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity, and could then deliver users an altered feed. Then, they recruited 1256 X users during the weeks prior to the 2024 US election. At random, some users had antidemocratic and hostile content placed more highly in their feed, lower in their feed, and had their feed unchanged. All participants were then surveyed about partisan polarization and their emotions.
Compared those whose feeds were unchanged: those with more anti-democratic and hostile content reported greater polarization as well as anger and sadness; those with less of this content reported less polarization and less anger and sadness.
Many far-right groups’ offline activities—like the insurrection at the US Capitol on January 6, 2021—were organized, in part, online. Do online communication tools, such as Discord or Telegram, facilitate radical political mobilization?
To address this question, Bailard et al (2024) examined the content of the Proud Boys Telegram channel. They counted the number of messages that identify some problem and/or attribute blame for a problem (diagnostic frames) or that emphasize shared identity and values to justify taking action (motivational frames). They examined changes in the number of violent events involving the Proud Boys before and after increases in diagnostic and motivational messages on Telegram.
They find that there are increases in Proud Boy violence in the week following an uptick in messages on Telegram.